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THE DETERMINANTS OF LEBANESE ATTITUDES 
TOWARD PALESTINIAN RESETTLEMENT: 
AN ANALYSIS OF SURVEY DATA 
 
Simon Haddad 
 
Abstract 
 
A principal goal of this study has been to assess the impact of social distance 
on attitudes towards Palestinian resettlement using comprehensive cross-
cultural survey research. The results are clear and consistent for all 
Lebanese sub-groups. Social distance is a significant predictor of attitudes 
toward resettlement for all six sub-groups examined. Specifically, social 
distance is inversely and consistently associated with unfavorable attitudes 
toward the prospect of the permanent settlement of Palestinian refugees in 
Lebanon. These findings indicate on one hand, that the majority of Sunnis 
and Druze respondents endorse communal ties with Palestinians and 
approve their permanent economic, social and political integration. 
However, social distance influence political attitudes toward Palestinian 
resettlement, namely in the case of Christian and Shii groups. Hence, for 
most Lebanese the question is about their own political survival not 
Palestinian resettlement If the actual perceptions stand, resettlement will 
create a potential for communal conflict and will affect the social cohesion of 
the society.  
 
Introduction 
 
   After half a century in the shadows, the Palestinian refugee issue has 
assumed a central place in the Arab-Israeli conflict with the initiation of the 
Middle East peace process in 1991.Following the discussions in Madrid, it 
has become clear that a satisfactory solution regarding the future of 
Palestinian refugees residing in Arab host countries is imperative for a 
durable peace in the Middle East. Pending a political solution that determines 
their fate, more than five million Palestinians continue to be refugees in 
various Arab countries. Although host population-refugee interaction vary 
proportionally to rights and restrictions accorded to Palestinians, Palestinians 
living in most parts of the Arab world have been considerably integrated 
(Aruri and Farsoun 1981; Brand 1988; Davis 1996; Arneberg 1997).  
   An exception is Lebanon, which continues to be the most reluctant of hosts. 
Lebanese officials seem concerned that Peace with Israel would eventually 
lead to the permanent settlement of Palestinians in the country. They worry 
that this cannot take place without further eroding the country’s precarious 
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demographic composition. After two decades of civil war, Palestinian 
presence has been the subject of much controversial debate ranging from 
statements calling for their comprehensive deportation to more careful and 
pragmatic propositions that they be granted civil rights and a more secure 
form of permanent residence. And while almost all segments of society-
politicians, religious leaders, political parties and scholars- joined the 
discussion, it is important to devote attention to public attitudes vis-à-vis the 
Palestinians and the prospect of their permanent settlement in Lebanoni. 
    Debate regarding the fate of Palestinians residing in Lebanon resurfaced 
with the confirmation in the Oslo Agreement that there is an agreement to 
settle the Palestinians in the countries where they actually reside. If a solution 
is reached regarding the Palestinians' presence, it will not provide for their 
return. Lebanese positions range from statements calling for their wholesale 
removal to more measured and accommodating suggestions that they be 
granted civil rights and a more secure form of residency. Not only the 
permanent settlement of Palestinians in Lebanon is outlawed under 
Lebanon’s constitution, but also public statements by Lebanese officials 
continue to itinerate a refusal to permanently integrate the refugees. Lebanese 
President Emile Lahoud confirmed this point when addressing a conference 
for Francophone countries in Canada that” all the Lebanese people agree that 
the permanent settlement of the Palestinian refugees is a time 
bomb”(Blanford 1999, p.18). Other examples of this common political 
position are a remark by a prominent Shii Lebanese politician, Abdallah Al-
Amin (Al-Majallah 1995): "The talk about settling the Palestinians does not 
concern us in any way. We say that the Palestinians must return to Palestine, 
as we are unable to absorb or settle anyone." Former Minister of Education 
Michel Eddeh (Al-Nahar November, 1999) concludes: " Lebanon refuses the 
implantation of the Palestinians on its territories, since this foreshadows the 
country's division." Sunni MP Ahmed Karami (Al-Nahar July, 1999) 
expressed his categorical opposition “While the foreign media have been 
suggesting that resettlement is going to be imposed on the Lebanese, we 
think that the Lebanese people, because of their unity and solidarity, can stop 
any resettlement plan”. 
   Although writings about Palestinian resettlement in Lebanon are numerous, 
most of them tend to be first, very much descriptive or mainly concerned 
about the refugees legal and socio-political standing (Salam 1994; Sayigh 
1994; Arzt 1996; El-Khazen 1997). Second, only rarely are studies 
nationwide and cross-cultural, with a concern of discovering what conditions 
social and political relationships. Third, and perhaps most important, there 
has been little research in which the individual Lebanese is the unit of 
analysis, and accordingly very few systematic databased investigations that 
focus on the link between the social and political orientations of ordinary 
Lebanese citizens toward Palestinian presence (Khashan 1994; Haddad 
2000). 
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  To these deficiencies may be added the dearth of information about the 
relationship between social attitudes held by the Lebanese towards 
Palestinians and their indefinite settlement in Lebanon. In order for 
Palestinian resettlement to be feasible, there needs to be general consensus in 
the country, including acceptance of various aspects and consequences of this 
position among the different sectarian groups. In a multi-confessional state 
that recognizes the primacy of religious communities, any decision or policy 
must satisfy all communities to be workable. Second, there should be overall 
low levels of intolerance for Palestinians in the population. In our view, 
minimal social integration and weak inter-communal bonds between 
Lebanese and Palestinian groups are a major obstacle to achieving 
resettlement without disrupting peaceful coexistence in the country. These 
two elements constitute a conceptualization of social distance that is 
appropriate to the Lebanese. Accordingly, to contribute to an understanding 
of whether and how social distance toward Palestinians influence the way 
that ordinary Lebanese think about resettlement, this study uses cross-
sectional survey data from Lebanon to examine the degree to which social 
distance account for variance in attitudes toward Palestinian resettlement in 
Lebanon.  
 
Theoretical and Methodological Aspects of the Study 
 
a-Relevant Theoretical Considerations 
   Immigration, involving long-term relocations of people across national 
borders, is a timely issue of sensible and academic importance. The act of 
leaving one's native country and settling in another country has immediate 
and long-term consequences for both immigrants and members of immigrant-
receiving nations. Immigration presents a range of challenges, and the 
challenge of managing immigration successfully--in ways that facilitate the 
achievement and well being of immigrants, that benefit the country 
collectively, and that produce the cooperation and support of members of the 
receiving society--is critical for nations and individuals (Dovidio and Esses 
2001). These issues have been framed academically largely in terms of 
economics, politics, and resource management. As a consequence, they have 
been studied extensively by economists, sociologists, political scientists, 
demographers, historians, and geographers (e.g., Borjas 1999; Cohen & 
Layton-Henry 1997; Hirschman, Kasinitz, & DeWind 1999; Rumbaut, 
Foner, & Gold 1999).  
   While an estimated 80 million migrants, almost 2 percent of the world's 
population, live permanently or for long periods of time outside their 
countries of origin (Castles 1993, p. 18) in most cases, and even European 
nations have seen harsh, often violent, reactions to these new minorities 
(Pettigrew 1998, p. 77). As Solomos and Wrench (1993) indicate, "In many 
societies in contemporary Europe, questions about migration and the position 
of minorities are amongst the most hotly contested areas of social and 
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political debate. Developments in Britain, France and Germany over the past 
decade have highlighted the volatility of the phenomenon and the ease with 
which it can lead to violent conflict" (p. 4). Even immigration that clearly 
and objectively benefits a nation as a whole does not necessarily have the 
same consequences for all segments of the population (Borjas 1999; Castells 
1997). Immigration may thus be perceived as threatening and undesirable by 
subsets of a population (Cohen 1997). Opposition to immigration may vary 
systematically as a function of perceived competition across time and for 
different segments of the receiving society (Esses, Jackson, & Armstrong 
1998). Many continue to view the new minorities as not belonging - even the 
growing numbers of the second- and third-generation who have lived only in 
the host nation. They view the new minorities as "a people apart" who violate 
traditional values and for whom they feel little sympathy or admiration and 
tend to discriminate against them (MacEwen 1995). Discrimination comes 
about only when individuals or groups are denied equal treatment (Allport 
1954, p.51)  
   Both direct and indirect discrimination are involved (Pettigrew 1998, p. 
79). Direct discrimination, where blatantly prejudiced people may oppose 
immigration categorically, is straightforward and sets up spatial boundaries 
of some sort to accentuate the disadvantage of immigrants. It occurs at points 
where inequality is generated, often intentionally. That is when steps to 
exclude members of a certain group from our neighborhood, school, 
occupation or country are taken. A classical example is provided by surveys 
of Black/White interracial contact in the United States. Scholars assert that 
White acceptance of Blacks across a range of formal and informal settings. 
Preferred social distance or pro-integration sentiments among Whites 
measured their acceptance concerning bringing a Black person home for 
dinner, allowing Blacks into the neighborhood, and permitting interracial 
marriage (Dovidio, Brigham, Johnson, & Gaertner 1996).  
   Indirect discrimination involves people with more subtle biases who may 
oppose the immigration of certain groups of people (i.e., stigmatized racial or 
ethnic groups) but justify their exclusion on the basis of reasons other than 
prejudice, such as economic reasons (Pettigrew & Meertens 1995). It 
operates when the inability to obtain citizenship restricts the opportunities of 
non-EU minorities in most institutions. It restricts their ability to get suitable 
housing, employment, and schooling for children. A visa is required for 
travel to other EU countries. In short, the lives of non-citizens are severely 
circumscribed (Wilpert 1993). Castles (1984) contends that the newcomers 
are established as a problematic and stigmatized outgroup, suitable for low-
status jobs but not for citizenship. Wilpert goes further. She asserts that 
Germany's institutions are based on "a dominant ideology, which distributes 
rights according to ethnic origins..." (Wilpert 1993, p. 70). The revealing 
comparison is between the almost two million Aussiedler and the 
Gastarbeiter. Officials regard the former as kin often on the thinnest of 
evidence, though since 1996 a language test must be taken. Aussiedler 
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readily become citizens and receive favorable government treatment. Yet 
even third-generation Turks, who are at least as culturally "German" as the 
Aussiedler, are largely denied citizenship and given unfavorable treatment.  
 
b-Obstacles to Palestinian Integration in Lebanon  
   There are no definitive figures concerning the number of Palestinians in 
Lebanon today but estimates suggest that the actual size of the Palestinian 
community is close or even 400 thousand or more than 10 percent of the 
country’s populationii. Because of the lack of census data and civil status 
records, political motives tend to distort accurate figures. 
   For the first few years following their arrival in 1948, Palestinians refugees 
were given material and moral support, but since then their treatment has 
deteriorated. Early governmental response was that the Palestinians are not 
allowed to stay indefinitely in the country and Lebanese authorities refused 
to discuss any solution that would open the door for the Palestinians to 
become assimilated or naturalized. In fact, the Lebanese government has 
made every effort to make life uncomfortable, and Lebanon unwelcoming, 
for the Palestinian community (Natour 1996, p.60). This policy is practiced 
consistently and with obsessive fervor to make sure that those Palestinians 
wishing to remain in Lebanon are unable to do so, under unbearable 
economic and political circumstances (Sayigh 2001). 
   Consequently, not only Palestinians were denied basic refugee or 
immigrant rights (Westin 2001), but also they have been in most cases the 
victim of official discrimination, social derogation and exclusion: First, 
restrictions on political rights and naturalization have ensured that 
Palestinians have been excluded from public institutions of social life and 
from the legal rights and protections the state affords to its citizens. 
Officially, the Palestinian community does not call for Lebanese citizenship, 
but those who can acquire it do so. In the past several years, around 50,000 
Palestinians have been naturalized in Lebanon. In 1994, citizenship has been 
granted to another 27,000 who were mostly Shii residents of Southern border 
villages who had Palestinian refugee status (Shaml 1997); the rest were 
Sunnis who, for reasons not made public, were naturalized in 1995, perhaps 
to balance out the Shii naturalization. Maronite protest ensured that the few 
remaining Palestinian Christians without Lebanese citizenship were then 
naturalized (Peteet 1999). In addition, travel restrictions on Palestinians were 
always tight, passports rarely given, and the only documents issued by the 
government were temporary. Accordingly, the greatest majority remains 
stateless and is treated as foreigners, since Lebanese law prevents 
Palestinians from buying propertyiii. 
    This leads us to the second type of governmental restraints, which has to 
do with economic integration in the labor market. This is where Lebanese 
and Palestinians meet, interact, and develop mutual interdependence. 
Palestinians are classified as special case category foreigners along with Sri 
Lankans, Thais, Filipinos, Kurds and Syrians, who together constitute 
 100
Lebanon's imported working class. A harsh policy referred to as 
“strangulation” of Palestinians is accomplished by extremely restrictive 
options that provides for employment only by permit and the near-total 
absence of social welfare provisions (Peteet 1997). Obtaining a work permit 
remains a complex and lengthy process that offers neither social security nor 
insurance benefits nor a regular wage increase, and becomes invalid when its 
holder is laid off the job. Moreover, employment in large institutions is 
largely closed to Palestinians because it is governed by sectarian rules. 
Palestinians, however, explicitly are forbidden to work in virtualy more than 
70 qualified professions such as medicine and law. These restrictions force 
them to work in the informal sector with low wages, insecurity and no 
benefits. On the other hand, and as a preventive measure to discourage them 
from remaining in the country, official policy has made it difficult for the 
younger generation to continue post-compulsory school studies, even if 
international assistance has helped to provide secondary school places for 
some. The normal public schools are closed to Palestinians, while private 
schools charge fees that are often beyond their means (Hammarberg 2000). 
   Third, legally enforced segregation in housing ensures that not only are 
Palestinians in Lebanon confined to well defined, circumscribed and 
surveilled camps but they are also prevented from urgent reconstruction work 
in the camps, which contribute to their insecurity. Restrictions on building 
and reconstruction in the camps have resulted in severe overcrowding. 
Refugees have been banned since 1992 from bringing in any kind of building 
material into camps "Not even stones to cover our graves, says a camp 
official” (The Economist 2000). Since the government did not show the 
slightest interest in integrating the refugees, Lebanon remains the only host 
country where the quota of camp inhabitants is still higher than 50 percent  
   Finally, and perhaps most important, Lebanese prejudice put into practice 
receives additional evidence from Palestinians’ perceptions of their situation 
in Lebanon. By definition, Palestinians are held in low regard by Lebanese 
and are often subject of negative stereotypes, hatred and hostility. 
Palestinians also recognized the differences between Lebanese and 
Palestinians in social prestige and socio-economic conditions. According to 
Peteet “there are several problems in distinguishing Palestinians from 
Lebanese and confining them to homogeneous enclaves” (Peteet 1996, p.28). 
However, until the late 1960s, the majority of Lebanese citizens did not 
manifest blatant prejudice or outright rejection for Palestinian refugees who 
came to Lebanon in 1948 and who share language and culture with their 
Lebanese hosts. In fact, many Palestinians have formed strong social and 
economic ties, through a long history of intermarriage and trade, to their host 
country. According to one Lebanese official (Brynen 1997), for example, 
fully one-quarter of third generation Palestinians in Lebanon has one 
Lebanese parent.  
   Although, urban Palestinian camps, which were scattered allover Lebanese 
territory had merged with surrounding Lebanese areas by the mid-seventies, 
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Lebanon’s official policy contributed, through deliberate spatial containment, 
to create and sharpen communal distinctions. During the 1950s, tight vigil by 
the army curtailed movement for Palestinians. Later, with the dissolution of 
state authority in the 1970s and 1980s, local Lebanese militias crafted and 
imposed boundaries where a fluidity of space and social relations once 
prevailed between Lebanese and Palestinians (Cutting 1988). In postwar 
Lebanon, Palestinian refugees describe their lives in terms of abnormality. 
Aside from shortages of shelter, food, safety and access to medical care and 
education, they have constant doubts about the security of residence. In fact, 
not only were Palestinians landscaped out of Palestine, but also the erasure 
continues in exile. A Palestinian lawyer, echoing popular sentiment, has 
written, " that there are those who believe that the group known as 
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon will stop existing within a few years (Al-
Natour 1993, p.41).” The refugee experience did not include the usual 
minority attributes of difference in language, religion and culture. Palestinian 
marginality is contingent, to some extent, on the concept of a Lebanese 
nation and society, however problematic, that excludes them. This negative 
identity held by their hosts prompted some observers to characterize the 
Lebanese society as minestrone rather than a melting pot, and encouraged the 
Palestinians to stress their culture, tradition and own identity (Koltermann 
1997). 
c-Basic Views on Palestinian Resettlement 
   Despite growing opposition to Palestinian resettlement, many think that 
Lebanon will have to face the reality of settling the Palestinians in it. Under 
the best circumstances, it might be possible to ensure that 250,000 to 300,000 
of them leave, but Lebanon will find itself compelled to absorb at least 
100,000 of them (Abd-al-Samad 1995; Khoury 2000). At the same time, 
there is very little support in Lebanon, at either the official or popular level, 
for the permanent resettlement of a significant number of Palestinians. In 
general, Lebanese authorities avoid raising this issue because it causes 
internal divisions, not about the principle of rejecting the settlement of 
Palestinians, but about the way in which this policy should be carried out. 
Some people in Lebanon believe that the presence of the Palestinians in 
Lebanon will created demographic, economic, social, and sectarian disorders. 
More specifically, Lebanon’s opposition to resettlement rests on three major 
perceived political and historical arguments (Solh 1999):  
* Economic: Lebanon's geographical area is very small in relation to its 
population. The Lebanese area that can be settled and exploited, after 
eliminating the mountains and deep valleys, is very small. This makes it 
unable to assimilate the Palestinian refugees, especially following the 
devastation inflicted by the civil wariv. Former Minister Michel Edde adds 
that it is “impossible” for Palestinian refugees to settle in Lebanon. “The 
economic situation is very difficult and people are emigrating due to the high 
rate of unemployment” (Daily Star, 30/12/2000). 
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* Political and Historical:  Granting the refugees sanctuary was undertaken 
as a humane, emergency measure; it was never intended to be permanent, the 
situation of the Palestinian refugees in the existing camps in Lebanon is 
basically different from their situation in some Arab countries where they 
live, work, and enjoy medical and educational security (Boueiz 1994). After 
more than 50 years, Lebanese see themselves as having paid a much higher 
price for the Palestinian cause than any other country. There are harsh 
memories of the civil wars of the 1970s and 1980s in which the Palestinians 
were blamed for dragging the country into bloodshed. Lebanese feel they 
cannot be asked to pay more in the form of the consequences incumbent on 
settling the Palestinians in Lebanon.  
* Demographic: Lebanon is a multi-confessional country with seventeen 
officially recognized sects. Lebanese belong to three main sects: Muslim, 
Christian and Druze. The Lebanese sectarian structure is very delicate. 
Palestinians citizenship would further skew the already shaky balance both 
between Christians and Muslims, and between Sunni and Shia Muslimsv. 
Any imbalance will have a political, social, economical, and security impact 
on it. Ever since, Lebanon found himself host to a large and overwhelmingly 
Muslim refugee population, the Christians anticipated that the largely 
Muslim refugees might threaten their economic and political dominance, and 
assumed demographic majority. They feared and still fear their presence 
could upset the sectarian balance and political status quo by serving as a 
focal point for the growing discontent of Lebanon's Muslims and their 
eventual political mobilization for a greater share of power and national 
resources. Lebanon’s Shiis concur; out of fear that Palestinians will tilt the 
Muslim Lebanese balance in the wrong direction. (The Economist 1992, 
p.45) 
   In fact the government still proclaimed the Palestinian refugees to 
constitute the greatest menace to national security. In this context, the 
immense number of mostly Muslim refugees was seen as highly explosive, 
threatening to blow up the entire political system of their host country. 
   The intensity of anti-Palestinian feelings, judged by the intensity and 
salience of hostile attitudes publicly expressed, prompted a journalist to 
characterize Lebanese attitudes towards Palestinians as ranging between two 
poles: indifference at one level and negativity at the other, with negativism 
varying between active hostility and passive dislike (Zeine 1994). 
Notwithstanding more concrete evidence are provided from cross sectional 
surveys of Lebanese groups (Khashan 1994; Haddad 2000). Previous 
research findings on the permanent settlement of Palestinian in Lebanon have 
pointed out that attitudes expressed by the Lebanese have been found to be 
highly non-supportive of resettlement, attitudes towards the Palestinians are 
variable, but usually negative. However, the relationship between attitudes 
towards the Palestinians as individuals or group and support for resettlement, 
which is the focus of the present report, has not been examined. 
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Methodology 
 
   In all, 1073 adult individuals, 688 male and 385 female respondents 
responded to these questions. The survey was carried out in late December 
1999 and January 2000, using a face-to-face interviewing procedure. The 
response rate (based upon the number of completed interviews, as compared 
with households contacted) was 80 percent.  
   The sample included five occupational sub-groups, selected on the basis of 
quota sampling necessitated by the fact that representative selection is not 
possible due to lack of accurate demographic data pertaining to the 
characteristics and the urban distribution of the population. Because the 
sample is non-probabilistic, it is important to describe its characteristics and 
to note that, in some respects, they differ from those of the larger Lebanese 
population over the age of 18.The sex distribution of the sample consisted of 
64 percent male and 36 percent female. The lower proportion of women in 
the study reflects their marginal position in the Lebanese society dominated 
by males as well as their limited professional role. The sample had an age 
range of 18-66 years and a mean age of 33 years. The representation of each 
confessional group is, as close as possible, in proportion to its actual size in 
Lebanon's population: 29 percent Maronites, 10 percent Greek-Catholics, 9 
percent Greek-Orthodox, 27 percent Shi`is, 18 percent Sunnis, and 7 percent 
Druze. In terms of educational level, the sample was found to be over-
represented in the college-educated level with 58 percent having achieved 
college education. Less-educated Lebanese generally have a problem in 
forming political opinions. In terms of occupational groupings the sample 
somewhat over-represented people with professional and managerial 
occupations, and underrepresented people in the trades and labor categoryvi. 
Despite some limitations, including the non-representative composition and 
the relatively small size of the sample, this data constitutes an empirical 
foundation possessing considerable strength. First, the availability of opinion 
data dealing with socio-political issues is itself a very notable strength 
because surveys dealing with political attitudes are extremely rare in the 
Arab world and also in Lebanon. Lebanese people in general are cooperative 
but have deep concern about their security. They suspect that most of such 
surveys are conducted to serve government objectives or a deceitful political 
organization. In responding to questionnaires what they think or write could 
be used against them. Second, the respondents were interviewed in an 
atmosphere of strict confidentiality, and well-trained interviewers of the 
same religious background interviewed the respondents in their native 
language (Arabic). The author maintained close contact with the field 
workers during the entire period of data collection and personally supervised 
the stage of data processing (coding and entry), including tabular preparation 
and presentation. Third, given the precarious nature of survey research in a 
conflictual environment three reliability test measures were imposed on the 
data: pre-testing, internal consistency and response bias. Consequently, 
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proper additions, deletions, and adjustments were made on the final version. 
In general, respondents attested that the questions were easily understood. 
 
Survey Instrument 
 
   In developing the survey instrument, an initial pool of items was 
constructed from two sources. Approximately half of the items were adapted 
from existing instruments (Allport 1954; Khashan 1994; Bettancourt & Dorr 
1998; Labianca et al. 1998; Tuch et al. 1999). The remaining items were 
developed anew by the investigator. Many of the items adapted from 
previous instruments were reworded to simplify their readability. Items were 
selected or developed to assess social distance and attitude toward 
resettlement, which represents the single dependent variable in this study. 
English and Arabic language versions were prepared. A copy of the 
interview schedule is available from the author.  
 
 
 
Table 1: Means and Standard Deviations for Independent and 
Dependent Variables by Religious Sect 
                  
  
Christian Groups 
                   
 Maronites Catholics Orthodox 
          
 Mean SD Coeff*   Mean SD Coeff*   Mean SD Coeff* 
ATR scaleª   2.51      0.69     0.66       2.43     0.75    0.68       2.27     0.81    0.75       
SD scale°     1.55      0.80     0.79       1.36      0.34    0.81       1.43     0.57    0.87       
Education     1.38      0.61      1.94      0.94     1.65 0.61     
Income 2.30     0.59            2.36 0.54     2.20    0.68  
Occupation   2.20      0.51  2.25 0.55  2.13     0.6  
 
Muslim Groups 
 
 Sunnis Shi’is Druze 
          
 Mean    SD   Coeff*   Mean   SD     Coeff* Mean    SD     Coeff
* 
ATR scaleª      1.68       0.81   0 .78      2.23      0.79   0.67       1.75      0.75   0.53     
SD scale°         2.34      0.87   0.83       1.96      0.91   0.82       2.31     0.86   0.84 
Education 1.58       0.65    1.68        0.70        1.42   0.69     
Income 2.28      0.63    2.44        0.53        2.21   0.53 
Occupation 2.22      0.60    2.45        0.55        2.10  0.45 
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Full Sample 
 
 Mean SD Coeff*     
ATR scaleª            2.21      0.82      0.75              
SD scale°               1.87       0.91      0.86             
Education 1.50      0.65                        
Income 2.32       0.58                     
Occupation 2.26      0.56                    
 
 
N.B: ªAttitudes toward Resettlement  
         o Social Distance 
        *Cornbach’s Alpha coefficient 
 
Independent Variable 
 
   The present analysis seeks to determine the role of social distance 
established between Lebanese and Palestinians in accounting for variance in 
attitudes toward Palestinian resettlement in Lebanon. A scale to determine 
the level of social distance was constructed from seven items dealing with 
views about preferred social distance between Lebanese and Palestinians. 
Multi-reliability and factor analysis were employed to ascertain the uni-
dimensionality of the scale. The survey items that cluster together are shown 
in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Survey Items Used to Measure Social Distance towards Palestinians  
 
1. Do you think that Lebanese and Palestinian students should go to same 
schools or to separate schools? 
2. How strong would you object or support if a member of your family had 
close personal relation with Palestinians? 
3. Do you think that there should be laws against marriage between Lebanese 
and Palestinians? 
4. How would you feel if a relative of yours was planning to marry a 
Palestinian? 
5. How would you feel if all your children’s’ schoolmates were Palestinians?                   
6.Would you accept to live in a neighborhood where the Palestinians are a 
majority? 
7.How willingly would you sympathize with Palestinians? 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Factor Analysis Scores for the Social Distance Items Using 
Varimax Rotation (full sample) 
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Item Loading 
Same or separate schools 
 
0.76 
Close personal relation  
 
0.81 
Laws against mixed marriage  
 
0.60 
Palestinian schoolmates 
 
0.79 
Palestinian neighborhood 
 
0.72 
Sympathize with Palestinians 
 
0.71 
Marry Palestinians 
 
0.84 
 
   Social distance or views on integration of Palestinians is the primary 
independent variable in this analysis. Nonetheless, whether it is related to 
attitude toward Palestinian resettlement is to be determined. Although it 
might be assumed that increased social distance implies opposition to 
Palestinian resettlement, permitting differentiation between independent and 
dependent variables, the actual situation is much more complex. Lebanese 
officials have issued contradictory statements about whether the Lebanese 
government will permit Palestinians to be fully integrated in the country, and 
even theoreticians and politicians advance different views about whether 
such integration is probable. 
    Bogardus introduced the Social Distance Scale for use as an index of the 
social distance that respondents perceive between themselves and members 
of different groups defined by nationality, ethnicity, religion, or politics. The 
scale, or some form of it, has been used in studies involving a variety of 
populations, including ethnic minorities (Bogardus 1925, 1967; Fagan & 
O’Neill 1965; Payne et al. 1974; Kunz & Ohenebra-Saki 1989; Lambert & 
Taylor 1990), and has been considered as a measure of prejudice. The survey 
contained a battery of likert scale questions (responded to in terms of strong 
agreement, agreement, etc.) tapping various aspects of the preferred social 
distance between oneself or one’s family and Palestinians living in Lebanon. 
Some items were phrased positively (i.e., indicating tolerance) and others 
were phrased negatively (i.e., indicating prejudice). From seven of the 
questions used in the survey, this scale which assesses respondents’ 
willingness to accept Palestinians in various roles (as a neighbor, friend, etc.) 
was constructed and checked by various empirical analyses (internal 
consistency of items in a scale, factor analysis of items, and scale inter-
correlations). The sum score of the items divided by their number was taken 
as an indication of negativeness or prejudice. The survey items that cluster 
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together are shown in Table 2. Other independent variables are also included 
in the analysis to assess the explanatory power of intense religiosity relative 
to that of other factors. Linear regression is used to examine these 
relationships, with the following independent variables included in the 
model: education, income and SES.  
 
2. The Dependent Variable 
 
Table 3: Survey Items used to measure the Dependent Variable 
 
1.If resettlement were imposed, would you accept it? 
2.If Palestinian resettlement were imposed, would you actually try to resist it 
militarily? 
3.Do you think that Palestinian resettlement will lead to inter-group conflict? 
4.Do you agree with the claim that Palestinian resettlement will result in the 
resumption of the civil war? 
5.Given your understanding of the Palestinian resettlement issue, would you 
say resettlement would have negative repercussions on Lebanese society? 
 
Factor Analysis Scores for the Attitudes towards 
Resettlement Items Using Varimax Rotation 
Item Loading 
Accept resettlement 
 
0.76 
Resist resettlement militarily 0.68 
Resettlement will lead to conflict over allocation of power 0.69 
Resettlement will result in the resumption of the civil war 0.66 
Resettlement would have negative repercussions on Lebanese 
society 
 
0.73 
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Table 4: Attitude Toward Palestinian Resettlement Scale by Religious Sect 
 
                                         
                                           
 
 
 
 
          
 
 Maronites   Catholics    Greek 
Or hodox t
23 
Sunnis        Shi'is Druze      Total          
Favors 
resettlement 
11 15 54 23 44 25 
Somewhat 
for 
resettlement 
27 26 27 24 32 38 29 
Opposes 
resettlement 
62 59 50 22 45 18 46 
 
(*) The items listed in Table 3 have been combined to form a scale.  
 
   The dependent variable in this analysis is attitude toward Palestinian 
resettlement. A scale composed on five inter-correlated items from the 
survey instrument measures attitude. Table 3 lists the items used to construct 
these measures, all of which deal with the respondents’ present position, 
perceived impact, and reaction to Palestinian resettlement, Table 4 presents 
the response distribution on these measures of the dependent variable. 
   Evidence in support of the validity and reliability of these measures comes 
from several sources. Multi-reliability analysis revealed high inter-item 
correlations and the reported Cornbach Alpha was equal to 0.86. Confidence 
was further increased by the use of factor analysis; the five items load highly 
on one factor demonstrating that these items cluster together and thus 
measure the same underlying concept. 
 
Analysis of The Findings 
 
   Table 1 presents the respondents mean ratings for all five independent and 
dependent variables used in the study. In addition to highlighting the socio-
economic status for every sub-group (community), two important results are 
generated. First, with regard to social distance, all three Christian groups, 
joined by the Shiis, display higher levels of discrimination against 
Palestinians compared to Sunnis and Druze. For instance, Christian groups 
scores were 64 percent, 61 percent, and 60 percent respectively in contrast to 
43 percent for the Shiis and 25 percent and 26 percent for the Druze on the 
social distance scale. Second, in terms of the overall level of support for 
Palestinian resettlement, the results indicated only moderate support among 
Sunnis and Druze in sharp contrast to Christian and Shii clear opposition to 
its prospect. These findings indicate that views of Lebanese communities are 
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less divided between Christians and Muslims than within each of the sub-
groups. Thus, in order to answer the research question concerning the 
independent relationship between the level of respondents’ social distance, 
their demographic characteristics, and their attitudes toward Palestinian 
resettlement, multiple regression analysis was employed. Table 5 presents 
beta weights and t statistics between social distance, education, income and 
SES and attitudes toward Palestinian resettlement. The results indicate that 
social distance is significantly related to attitudes toward resettlement for all 
sub-groups. Thus, the higher the respondents’ level of social distance, the 
less the overall support given to resettlement. In other words respondents 
from all sects are much less likely to support resettlement in Lebanon if they 
contest future personal contact with Palestinians, whether civic, educational 
or residential. Indeed, these relationships are always stronger than those 
involving any other independent variable, i.e. educational attainment in the 
case of the Sunnis and income level for the Shiis were found significantly 
related to the criterion variable (p>0.05). 
 
Table 5 
Multiple Regression of Factors influencing Attitudes toward Palestinian 
Resettlement in Lebanon 
 
 Maronites   Catholics    Greek 
Orthodox 
Sunnis        Shi'is Druze      Full 
Sample         
    (n=283)    (n=83) (n=83) (n=158) (n=226) (n=68)      (N=901)    
Social 
distance       
-0.33  
 (-5.77)**    
-0.43 
(-4.33)** 
0.49  
(-5.05) **    
--0.47  
(-7.02)**    
- 0.40 
(-6.49)**   
-0.40 
(-3.57)**    
-0.47 
(-16.04)**     
Education        -0.11 
(-1.89)         
0.02    
(0.17)          
-0.08 
(-0.84)         
0.28   
(4.10)**     
0.030  
(0.467)     
0.070 
(0.62)          
0.00  
(0.26) 
Income            -0.09 
(-1.52)        
-0.14 
(-1.38)        
-0.04  
-(0.42)         
0.06 
(0.83)         
0.155 
(2.55)*     
0.12  
(1.09)         
0.04 
(1.46) 
SES -0.02 
(-.42)           
-0.13 
(-1.27)        
- 0.06 
(-0.60)         
0.00  
(0.10)         
- 0.82  
(-1.04)      
0.16  
(1.39)         
0.03  
(1.07) 
Constant 34.81)**   (19.52)**    (17.65)**    (10.34)**   (9.30)**   (10.67)**     (54.61)** 
R²                    0.11             0.19          0.24             0.30            0.17          0.16             0.22 
 
 
NOTE: Table 5 shows standardized coefficients (betas) and gives t statistics 
in parentheses *p<0.05;**p<0.01 
   Although part of these findings is to be expected- in the case of Christian 
groups- those related to Muslim groups- are surprising and interesting. They 
are also at variance with the arguments advanced by some scholars, to the 
effect that Tawtin, or resettlement, is probably the only issue on which the 
views of the Lebanese - across ideological and confessional lines - agree. 
This argument is presented by El-Khazen (1997) who contends that 
Palestinian presence, from being the most divisive issue in post-
independence Lebanese politics is one of the few issues that arouse national 
consensus in post-war Lebanon. A more plausible argument is offered by 
Sayigh (2001) who asserts that Lebanese public can be divided into three 
main segments: 1) a determined anti-Palestinian minority, 2) a large 
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component who are indifferent to the Palestinian issue unless aroused by 
sectarian campaigning, and 3) a minority that positively supports the 
refugees. 
   Findings from the present study lend only partial support to these 
arguments. Social distance defined in terms of degree of endorsement or 
rejection of inter-communal -social, civic, residential, educational- ties with 
Palestinians bears a significant relationship about attitude toward 
resettlement. Intense anti-Palestinianism is discernible in the case of 
Christian groups namely in statements like: "Usually, we don't care about 
them. Sometimes we feel pity for them because they are poor. But we don't 
think that they belong here” (Kolterman 1997, p.7). A reconstructive ethos 
promoting "Lebanon for the Lebanese”, which has been carried by Lebanese 
Christians throughout the civil war, is reiterated usually by Christian leaders 
who tend to exaggerate the size of the Palestinian community and use the 
question of resettlement to flourish their political vision of partitionvii. 
Religious affinity plays a part in this extreme position since the Palestinian 
refugee population is constituted as nearly all Muslim (Peteet 1997). Prior to 
the 1975 civil war, in order to further a sectarian gloss to the refugee issue, 
and in a demographic attempt to bolster the Christian population, the 
Lebanese Government made available Lebanese citizenship to Palestinian 
Christians. One of the major consequences of the Civil War was 
Confessional “cleansing” of Palestinian refugee camps in Christian-
controlled areas to other parts of the country. Massive population shifts, 
accompanied by the reintegration of displaced Palestinians into more 
homogeneous, self-contained and exclusive spaces and the consequent 
physical separations have confined Palestinian interaction to practically two 
Lebanese groups, Sunni and Shii Muslims (Khashan 1992). However, a 
highly significant negative relationship between social distance and attitude 
toward resettlement emerges from the findings. Beyond political factors, 
such as the deterioration of Palestinian-Lebanese relationship, heavy-handed 
Israeli retaliation and PLO excesses, a set of economic asymmetries added to 
Palestinian-Shii antagonism. Both communities lived side by side but the 
Shii belonged to a lower low socio-economic spectrum. Underclass 
resentment aroused because of the material advantage enjoyed by 
Palestinians who were well established in Arab oil-producing states 
projecting Palestinians as aliens, intruders and destroyers of our country 
(Sayigh 1994). Referring to Palestinian misbehavior during their presence in 
Lebanon, a Shii villager told Norton “ We gave Palestinians everything and 
they gave us back insults, corpses, and lessons in corruption” (Norton 1987, 
p. 12). 
   This negative position is extended only to a minority of Sunni respondents. 
Khashan and Palmer (1981), who examined Sunni perceptions during the 
Lebanese civil war, found out that the dominant position enjoyed by 
Palestinians during that period, while not vociferously opposed by the 
Sunnis, was complicated by the fact that Lebanese Sunnis generally accorded 
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the Palestinian refugees an inferior social status. Thus, Palestinian-Lebanese 
Sunnite affinity was partially eroded by military dominance of Palestinians 
and by the reversal of status roles (Khashan & Palmer 1981). While part of 
the Sunnis tends to distance themselves from Palestinians, this tendency is 
stronger among less educated Sunnis than among their college-educated 
counterparts. Indeed this result is striking since the integration of refugees is 
supposed to take place, according to experts, within their sub-community. 
However, this finding is in line with the position adopted by most Sunni 
politicians. In 1990, even the Sunni Muslim leaders-who theoretically had 
most to gain from the assimilation of the Sunni Palestinians into Lebanese 
society- refused to welcome the Palestinians. This ultimately led to the 
unexpected amendment to the constitution refusing non-Lebanese permanent 
residence in the country. Later, Sunni prime Prime Minister Rafic al-Hariri 
explicitly uttered, "Lebanon will never, ever integrate Palestinians. They will 
not receive civic or economic rights or even work permits. Integration would 
take the Palestinians off the shoulders of the international agency that has 
supported them since 1948" (Cooley 1999, p.1) 
   Experiences of Palestinian marginality in interacting with Lebanese are 
illustrated by Sayigh ”Palestinian refugees have been pathologized in a 
manner reminiscent of turn-of-the-century American hyperbole that 
immigrants carried tuberculosis, and more recent fears of immigrants as 
carriers of the AIDS virus. Pathology demands quarantine: segregating 
Palestinians would facilitate the "normalization" of Lebanon in the post-war 
era with national health restored through the isolation of an infectious 
presence” (Sayigh 1996, p. 28). 
   Pro-Palestinian voices present a weak minority in favor of resettlement. A 
housing project submitted by the Canadian government to help provide a 
certain measure of relief to the homeless refugees through the construction of 
new barracks outside Beirut was supported in 1994, by Walid Jumblatt, 
Minister for Refugees and leader of the Druze community. However, the 
media leaked the talks and the violent protests that ensued led to the 
abandonment of the entire project. This was a symptom of the fact that any 
initiative that can be interpreted as indirect assent to the Palestinians 
remaining is interpreted as a confessionalistic move. The Druze minority was 
mainly interested in a buffer zone of loyal Palestinians between them and the 
expanding Shi'a population. This is a clear indicator of expressed social 
desirability of Palestinians by a large segment of the Druze community. 
   The findings of the present study indicated that social distance was a 
significant predictor variable for all sub-groups-and the only predictor for 
most of them, i.e. Christians and Druze. According to this concept, not only 
does an observer interpret a group or member of a group erroneously, he or 
she concludes that it he is inferior and therefore unwanted. This tendency for 
outgroups rejection and hostility is clearly reflected in the study’s findings 
that a high rating of social distance is related to the rejection of Palestinian 
permanent settlement in Lebanon. Specifically, the study’s findings indicated 
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that respondents who tend to score highly on the social distance scale 
believed that resettlement will have damaging repercussions on the country, 
and are therefore more likely to resist it.  
   To conclude, some brief observations pertaining to other independent 
variables may be offered. Findings about these variables are not always 
consistent and are, in any event of secondary importance to the present study. 
In his attempt to determine the correlates of multiculturalism in Australia, 
Robert Ho (1990) found that ethnocentrism was the only significant 
predictor, but none of the demographic variables, for respondents’ attitudes 
toward multiculturalism. In fact, respondents’ education, income, and SES 
level were, in most cases, unimportant predictors of attitudes toward 
resettlement. Nevertheless, there are several interesting relationships, some 
of which identify promising areas for future research. To begin, the absence 
of any significant relationship involving SES deserves mention. It delineates 
the failure of the analysis to control for other meaningful factors, most 
notably the respondents’ level of economic security and the perceived effect 
of immigration on employment opportunities. In multicultural Canada, 
economic concerns and worries have been assigned a more important role 
than intolerance in determining the attitude toward immigration. 
Furthermore, because Lebanon suffers from economic stagnation at the 
moment, it may be hypothesized that perceived economic insecurity would 
have pushed towards opposition to resettlementviii. This proposition, which 
deserves future study, is consistent with findings about determinants of 
political attitudes toward immigration in Western countries. In his survey of 
Canadian attitudes toward immigration, Tienhaara (1974) found that 
opposition to immigration was greater during recession and attributed most 
to unemployment concerns. This point receives support from a recent 
investigation that brought similar results using survey data in many studies 
on immigration and attitudes towards immigrants (Palmer 1996). The 
economic dimension is particularly worthy of examination as Lebanon may 
be expected to accept permanent settlement of refugees induced by a 
tremendous aid/development package. If economic conditions improve as a 
result of Palestinian resettlement, would this reduce social distance and hence 
opposition for resettlement? Coupled with the present study’s findings that 
social distance account for variance in Lebanese attitudes toward Palestinian 
resettlement, this suggests that a multi-factor model, including other 
variables pertaining to the Lebanese situation have a much larger effect on 
attitudes toward resettlement than do the respondents’ self-interest measures. 
 
Conclusion 
 
   A principal goal of this study has been to assess the impact of social 
distance on attitudes towards Palestinian resettlement using cross-sectional 
survey research. The results are clear and consistent for all Lebanese sub-
groups. Social distance is a significant predictor of attitudes toward 
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resettlement for all six sub-groups examined. Specifically, social distance is 
inversely and consistently associated with unfavorable attitudes toward the 
prospect of the permanent settlement of Palestinian refugees in Lebanon. 
   These findings indicate that, although social distance influence political 
attitudes toward Palestinian resettlement-a conclusion that is hardly 
surprising for Christian and Shii groups- the majority of Sunnis and Druze 
respondent endorse communal ties with Palestinians and approve their 
permanent economic, social and political integration. They also suggest a 
more focused conclusion about the kind of social factors most likely to have 
explanatory power. Judgments about the perceived consequences and to 
economic needs in particular appear to be important in determining the 
attitude toward resettlement. This proposition, which receives support from 
findings about the importance of nature of perception of immigration on 
economic status, offers a promising area for future research.  
   Keeping in mind that the nature of the sample employed in the present 
study may limit the generalizability of the obtained results, the overall 
findings carry a number of implications for the issues raised on the current 
debate over Palestinian permanent settlement in Lebanon and also for the 
Lebanese system as a whole. How genuine are Lebanese fears about 
resettlement? Palestinian otherness is juxtaposed not to a homogeneous 
singular category of Lebanese, but to a shifting set of sectarian groups and 
alliances, each with particular interests and fears. A majority of Christian and 
Shii respondents display intense prejudice towards Palestinians suggesting 
the presence of social barriers that hinders socio-economic integration of 
camp inhabitants and their children. On the other hand, the results suggest 
the presence of a structural weakness in the Lebanese system. Lebanese 
scholar Joseph Maila (2000) concedes that the permanent settlement of the 
Palestinian refugees in Lebanon, the vast majorities of whom are Sunni 
Muslim, could be fatal to Lebanon’s delicate social mosaic. The Palestinians 
could turn into an autonomous community, a development unprecedented in 
Lebanon. The kind of linkage between these Palestinians and the Palestinian 
Authority is likely to create tremendous problems for the Lebanese in the 
coming yearsix. Hence, for most Lebanese the question is about their own 
political survival not Palestinian resettlement. These negative attitudes, 
coupled with further government restrictions and pressures on Palestinians, 
imply that permanent settlement is a dangerous alternative that threatens the 
regime with collapse. If the actual perceptions stand, resettlement will create 
a potential for communal conflict and will affect the social cohesion of the 
society. In connection with this, the Lebanese government finds itself 
compelled to consent to continued Palestinian military presence in refugee 
camps, which threatens to return to the situation of 20 years ago by 
reenacting the civil war. Refugees in Palestinian camps have grown 
increasingly restive over the course of the uprising. Lebanese authorities are 
discounting fears that the fighting in the Palestinian territories could spark a 
series of organized cross-border attacks into Israel from south Lebanon. 
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Whereas, Muslim clerics have been calling for active support to liberate 
Palestine, Christians responded by condemning “the voices announcing their 
intentions to violate Lebanese laws and attempt to go back to a past the 
Lebanese want to forget (Daily Star 7/10/2000). 
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Endnotes 
 
iIn addition to increased attention to the Palestinian refugee question in 
Lebanon, a conference on Palestinian Resettlement were upheld in 1999,” 
Lebanese Identity: Between Naturalization and Implantation,” at the 
University of Saint Esprit, Kaslik, on November 11 and academic workshop 
entitled” Opposing Resettlement” at The Saint Joseph University organized 
by Research Center for Arab Law, Beirut on November 26 grouping 
prominent Lebanese figures and even the prime minister. This trend received 
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additional support with the announcement that Lebanese clerics of all sects 
intended to hold conference to take a harsh stance on the matter on July 29.  
 
ii See Palestinians in Lebanon, Report on the Conference Held at Oxford, 
September 27th to 30th, 1996 (Oxford: Center for Lebanese Studies, 1996), 
p. 10. More recently Maronite deputy Naamatullah Abi-Nasr, former 
president of the Maronite League, offered a figure of 12 percent compared to 
other Arab host countries where Palestinian represent 1 percent of the 
population in the United Arab Emirates and only 0.1 percent in Egypt and in 
Saudi-Arabia during a conference entitled” Lebanese Identity: Between 
Naturalization and Implantation," attended by the author on Palestinian 
Resettlement at the University of Saint Esprit, Kaslik, Lebanon, on 
November 26, 1999 . 
 
iii Recently Lebanese Parliament approved revisions to Law 11614 (1969) 
concerning ownership of real estate by foreigners, forbidding "anyone who 
does not have citizenship in a recognized state (Palestinians)" from owning 
property, text published by al-Safir, 23 March, 2001). 
 
iv This could mean that 40 to 45 percent of total Lebanese territory cannot be 
exploited and may result in increasing the population density to reach 
632/km². This is a huge figure compared to other countries like Irak 47/km² 
and Australia 2/km². 
 
v Though Lebanon’s constitution allocates public offices on the basis of a 
50:50 ratio of Christians vs. Muslims, it is commonly accepted that the 
Muslims constitute a majority in the country. 
viThe author sought to broaden the representativeness of the sample by 
including 20 professions which were regrouped into five sub-groups for 
reasons of data manageability: 19 percent professionals, 40 percent semi-
professionals, 11 percent unskilled, 25 percent college students (selected 
from three private academic institutions: Notre-Dame University and 
Lebanese University, and the American University of Beirut) and 5 percent 
unemployed.  
 
vii Maronite politicians such as Michel Edde and Naamatulah Abi-Nasr have 
brought the number of Palestinians in Lebanon to 500,000 and 600,000 
respectively stressing that resettling them means partitioning the country.  
 
viii This dimension receives additional support knowing that that 
unemployment in Lebanon is said to have exceeded 27 percent and that the 
demographic composition of the Lebanese society includes a formidable 
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percentage of 31 percent of foreigners (source Debate regarding Palestinian 
Presence in Lebanon MTV Television. Beirut, 11 November 1999). 
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